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Abstract 
In this paper we analyze two recent axiomatic 
approaches proposed by Dubois et al. [5] 
and by Giang and Shenoy [10] for qualita­
tive decision making where uncertainty is de­
scribed by possibility theory. Both axiom­
tizations are inspired by von Neumann and 
Morgenstern's system of axioms for the case 
of probability theory. We show that our ap­
proach naturally unifies two axiomatic sys­
tems that correspond, respectively, to pes­
simistic and optimistic decision criteria pro­
posed by Dubois et al. The simplifying uni­
fication is achieved by (i) replacing axioms 
that are supposed to reflect two informational 
attitudes (uncertainty aversion and uncer­
tainty attraction) by an axiom that imposes 
order on set of standard lotteries, and ( ii) us­
ing a binary utility scale in which each utility 
level is represented by a pair of numbers. 
1 Introduction 
The main goal of this paper is to compare two re­
cent axiomatic approaches proposed by Dubois et al. 
[5] and Giang and Shenoy [10] for qualitative decision 
making where uncertainty is described by possibility 
theory. 
In recent years, there is growing interest in qualitative 
decision making within the AI community [3, 2]. The 
aim of the research is to deal with various situations 
where probability and utility inputs required by the 
classical decision theory are difficult to assess. It is 
long recognized that probability theory can not faith­
fully capture all facets of uncertainty that is pervasive 
in the world. Among several alternative approaches 
proposed in AI to deal with uncertainty, belief func­
tion theory [15, 16], interval-valued probability [13, 20] 
and fuzzy possibility theory [21, 6] occupy prominent 
positions. Once uncertainty has been represented, the 
next step is to determine how it can be used in decision 
making. For the first two theories where probabilistic 
semantics are still relevant, a standard solution is to 
assess (according to some criteria) a probability dis­
tribution and then apply the classical decision theory. 
For possibility theory, which apparently has no such 
strong connection with probability, the technique is of 
little use. In recent years, efforts have been made to 
create an axiomatic basis for decision theory tailored 
for possibility theory. Stylistically, the efforts are in 
two different but related directions following von Neu­
mann - Morgenstern and Savage [5, 9]. 
This paper is structured as follows. In the next section, 
the proposal by Dubois et al. for a decision theory with 
possibility theory is reviewed. In section 3, we will 
present a new system of axioms that has been modi­
fied from our previous proposal designed for Spohnian 
epistemic belief theory. We prove a representation the­
orem for that system. In the section 4, a comparison 
between two approaches is made. We prove a theorem 
stating that the two axiomatic systems by Dubois et 
al. are just special cases of our system. An example 
that illustrates calculation with different utility func­
tions is provided. The last section consists of some 
concluding remarks. 
2 Pessimistic and Optimistic Utilities 
In this section, we review, with some terminology mod­
ification, the proposal that has been exposed in a series 
of papers by Dubois et al. [8, 4, 5]. Assume a set S of 
possible situations or states. A finite uncertainty scale 
V is assumed, without loss of generality, to be a set 
of points in the unit interval [0, 1] such that 0, 1 E V. 
Order� on Vis defined in a natural way. Uncertainty 
about which among possible states will occur is cap­
tured by a possibility distribution that is a mapping 
1r : S ---+ V such that max•EB 1r( s) = 1. The possibility 
of a subset A� S, 1r(A) �£ max•EA 1r(s). A finite set 
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X = { x1, x2, .. . Xn} of consequences or outcomes or 
prizes is also given. To avoid triviality, X is assumed 
to have at least two elements (n;:: 2). We also assume 
the existence of two distinct anchor1 elements in set 
X. xis the best and .;r is the worst i.e., x � Xi and 
Xi � .;r Vi where � is a preference relation with the 
reading "at least as good as". A decision or lottery is 
a mapping from S - X. That is, decision d delivers 
outcome d(s) in the case that state s occurs. Notice 
that each decision d induces a possibility distribution 
:rr d on the set of consequences in the following sense: 
:rrd (x) �f 7r(d-1(x)) where d-1(x) = {s E Sjd(s) = x}. 
Denote by IIx the set of possibility distributions on 
X. Set IIx is closed under an operation (possibilis­
tic) mix. For :rr1,7T2 E IIx and A,f..L E [0,1] such 
that max(>.., f..L) = 1, a mixture of 1Tt, :rr2 with weights 
>..,/-L denoted by (>../:rr1,f..L/7r2) can be defined as follows 
(>../:rr1, f..L/7r2) (x) = max( min(>.., :rr1 (x )) , min(f..L)7r2(x)) ). 
Mixture operation is pairwise commutative in the 
sense that (>../:rr1, f..L/:rr2) = (f..L/:rr2, >..j?Tl). It is useful to 
consider a generalized version of mix operation: a mix­
ture of m possibility functions :rr1, ... 7rm with weights 
>..1, ... Am such that max19�m {>..i} = 1 defined as 
To a decision maker, the value of decision d is the 
same as the value of the induced 7rd· And thanks to 
the mixture construct, set I1x is rich enough to encode 
not only a simple decision but also a "compound" de­
cision. For an intuitive reference, a reader can find a 
similarity between the concept of possibilistic mixture 
and that of two-stage lottery or "randomized" deci­
sions in probabilistic approach. A logical conclusion 
of the above argument is that an analysis of prefer­
ence on decisions boils down to the analysis of set IIx 
of possibility distributions on the set of consequences 
X. In other words, preference of a decision maker can 
be analyzed through a preference relation � on Ilx. A 
preference relation could be characterized by a system 
of axioms (properties) it must satisfy or it could be 
modeled by a utility function that maps elements of 
ITx into some (finite) linearly ordered scale U called 
the utility scale. sup(U) = 1 and inf(U) = 0 are as­
sumed. Symbol :::: is used for both numerical and util­
ity comparison. 
Dubois et al. consider two kinds of utility called re­
spectively pessimistic and optimistic utility and pro­
pose two axiomatic systems to characterize them. 
1The term is chosen to reflect the role these elements 
play in the continuity axiom presented later in the section. 
2.1 Pessimistic Utility 
The pessimistic utility concept needs the following in­
gredients: a function 
(2) 
that determines utility for each outcome such that 
u(x) = 1 and u(.;r) = 0; a function 
n:U-+U (3) 
that is an order reversing involution in U i.e. n(1) = 0, 
n(O) = 1 and n(u1) ;:: n(u2) whenever u1 � u2; and a 
function 
h :V-+U (4) 
that is an order preserving mapping from uncertainty 
scale V onto utility scale U such that h(1) = 1 and 
h(O) = 0. Given that, a pessimistic qualitative utility 
function Qu- : Ilx - U is defined as 
QU- (1r) �r min max(nh(1r(x)),u(x)) (5) xEX 
where nh �r n o h - a composition of n and h. 
Dubois et al. also show the following equality 
Given a utility function, one can specify a preference 
relation 2 � on Ilx. Alternatively, that relation can be 
characterized by the following axiom system denoted 
by Sp 
A1- (Total pre-order) � is reflexive, transitive and 
complete. 
A2- (Uncertainty aversion) If :rr � 71"1 then 7r � 1r'. 
A3- (Subsitutability) If:rr1 '"'-'7T2 then (>../7rt,f..L/7r)""' 
(>../7r2, f..L/11"). 
A4- (Continuity) V:rr E IIx, :J>.. E V 1r"' (1/x, >../;&). 
Dubois et al. prove the following representation theo­
rem 
Theorem 1 A preference relation � on ITx satis­
fies system S p iff there exist functions u, n, h and 
Qu- defined as by (2, 3, 4, 5) such that 1r � 71"' iff 
Qu- (7r);:: Qu-(7r'). 
2We also use two derivative relations: >- for strict pref­
erence and "' for indifference. 
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2.2 Optimistic Utility 
The authors also consider another utility that sup­
posedly captures the optimistic behavior of decision 
makers. The optimistic qualitative utility function 
QU+ : IIx ---+ U is defined as follows 
QU+(1r) �f maxmin(h(1r(x)),u(:r)) (7) xEX 
The system So of axioms that characterize QU+ is 
obtained from S p by replacing axioms A2-, A4- by 
A2+ and A4+ respectively where 
A2+ (Uncertainty attraction) If 7r ;::: 7r1 then 1r t 7r1• 
A4+ (Continuity) V1r E IIx, 3.\ E V 1r"" (.\fx, 1/.;£). 
They also prove a representation theorem for Qu+ and 
So which is similar to Theorem 1. 
3 Unified Possibilistic Utility 
In this section, we will translate the construct of qual­
itative utility [10} that was originally proposed for 
Spohn's theory of epistemic belief into the possibility 
theory framework. 
A theory of epistemic belief, originally proposed by 
Spohn [17, 18] to deal with plain belief, has its roots in 
Adams's [1] work on the logic of conditionals. Spohn's 
theory has been studied extensively by Goldszmidt and 
Pearl [11, 12] under the name "rank-based system" or 
"qualitative probabilities" or "/'\,-calculus". The ba­
sic construct of the theory is the concept of disbe­
lief function 8 : S ----> N such that minsES 8(s) = 0 
where N is the set of non-negative integers. For 
A � S, 8(A) �f minsEA 8(s). For A � S and s E A, 
the conditional disbelief function fJ(siA) is defined as 
fJ(siA) �f 8(w) - 8(A). Despite some nuances, there 
is a tight relationship between possibility theory and 
Spohn's theory through log-transformation that has 
been pointed out in [7]. Namely, for a disbelief func­
tion 8, c-6 is a possibility function where c > 1 is a 
constant. Conversely, if 1r is a possibility function then 
Int[-Iogc(1r)] is a disbelief function where Int[.] is a 
integer extracting function. 
Here are some technical notes. In [10], we have 6 ax­
ioms that were inspired by presentation of von Neu­
mann and Morgernstern's axiom system by Luce and 
Raiffa [14]. Here, in order to make later comparison 
more transparent, we will present those axioms in a 
slightly modified form. In [10] we used the product­
based mixture in the set of Spohnian lotteries in this 
paper we will adopt the min-based mixture for possi­
bilistic lotteries. 
We use term standard lottery for a lottery that real­
izes (with corresponding degrees of certainty) in either 
the best prize x or the worst�. i.e., (.\fx, p,/�) where 
A, p, E V and max(,\, p,) = 1. We use B to denote the 
set of all standard lotteries. 
We have the following system of axioms that is denoted 
by S without subscript. 
B1 (Total pre-order) t is reflexive, transitive and 
complete. 
B2 (Qualitative monotonicity) t restricted over B 
satisfies the following condition. Let suppose a = 
(.\fx, p,/�) and a'= (X fx, p,' h) then 
{ 1 :::: .\ ;::: .\' & 1-L = p,' = 1 
ata' iff .\=1&.\'<1 
.\ = ,.\' = 1 & f-L ::; p,' 
(8) 
B3 (Subsitutability) If 1r1 ""1r2 then (.A./7r1,p,/7r) "" 
(A/1r2, f.-L/'rr). 
B4 (Continuity) Vx E X, 3a- E B x ""'a. 
We list the axioms of S in the same order as those of 
Sp. Compared with the system in [10], we note the 
following correspondence: B1 (Total pre-order) axiom 
incorporates Axioms 1 and 5 (order of prizes and tran­
sitivity), B2 is Axiom 6, B3 is Axiom 3 and B4 is 
Axiom 4. Reduction of compound lotteries axiom is 
taken care of by the definition of possibilistic mixture. 
We need a lemma. 
Lemma 1 Assume t satisfies S (axioms B1 through 
B4). For each 1r E IIx, there exists one and only one 
a E B such that 7f ""'a. 
Proof: By definition of possibilistic mixture (1), 
1r can be rewritten in the form of a mixture 
(7r(x1)/x1, 1r(x2)/x2, ... K(xn)/xn). By B4, we have 
Xi ""' ai for 1 ::; i � n where O'i is a stan­
dard lottery ai = (,\ifx, p,;f�). By B3, we have 
1r ""'  (n(xi)/ai,7r(x2)/a2, ... 7r(xn)/an) · Again using 
the definition of mixture, we 
have (1r(xt)/a1, 1r(x2)/a2, ... 'll'(xn)/an) = (>..fx, f-t/12) 
where 
So 1r ""' (.\fx, p,/;£). By B1 and B2, (,\fx, f-Lh) must 
be unique. • 
Let us consider a utility function QU : IIx - U. If we 
wish that 1r1 ;:: 1r2 iff QU(7r1) ;::: QU(1r2) holds , from 
qualitative monotonicity (B2), it is clear that utility 
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<0, 1>+-------., <1, 1> 
<1, 0> 
Figure 1: Binary utility scale Uv. 
scale U must be at least rich enough to distinguish 
every standard lottery. Let us take 
Uv �r {<A,,u> IA , f.L E Vand max(>.,f.L) = 1}. (9) 
In other words, Uv is the set of pair of elements in 
the uncertainty scale V such that one of them is 1. A 
linear order ;::: on Uv is defined as, for u =< >., f.L >, 
u'=<>..', f.L'>, 
{ 1 ;::: >. ;::: >.' & f.L = f.L1 = 1 
u ;::: u' iff >. = 1 & >.' < 1 
>.=>.'=1&1-L::;fL' 
(1 0) 
We refer to Uv equipped with the order ;::: as the binary 
utility scale. 
We extend3 operation min in such a way that it is 
distributive with respect to pairing as follows 
min( a, <,6, ')'>) �f <min( a, ,6), min( a,')')> (11) 
We also extend operation max so that it is associative 
with respect to pairing 
max( <a, ,6>, <')', 8>) �r <max( a, f'), max(,6, 6)> (12) 
Let us call a function u : X ----> Uv that assigns utility 
for each prize in X a basic utility assessment. We 
say that a basic utility assessment is consistent with 
� if for any pair x, y E X x � y iff u(x) ;::: u(y), 
u(x) =<1, 0> and u(.a;.) =<0, 1 >. Remember that x 
and .a;. are respectively the best and the worst prizes in 
X. For a given basic utility assessment u, let us define 
a utility function QU : IIx --+ Uv as follows 
QU(1r) �f maxmin(1r(x), u(x)) xEX (13) 
We have the following lemma on standard lotteries 
Lemma 2 Suppose a = (>..jx, ILl±) is a standard lot­
tery then QU(a) =<A, f.L> . 
3We decide in favor of extending operations min and 
max instead of creating new symbols. Hopefully, this slight 
abuse of notation does not lead to any confusion because 
the type of arguments will tell which rule is to apply. 
Proof: We have by definition of QU 
QU(a") =max( min(>.., <1, 0> ), min(f.L, <0, 1> ) )  
=max( <A, 0>, <0, f.L>) 
=<A.,,u> . •  
Now we have the following representation theorem 
Theorem 2 � on IIx satisfies axioms B1 through B4 
iff there exists a consistent basic utility assessment u 
such that 1r � 7r1 iff QU(1r) ;::: QU(1r') 'rhr, 1r1 E llx 
where QU is defined by (13). 
Proof: 
( �) Suppose � satisfies axioms B 1 through B4. For 
1r1> rr2 E Ilx, let us assume 1ri(x;) = rrli and 1r2(x;) = 
1r2; for 1 ::; i ::; n. Suppose 1r1 � 1f2, we will show that 
QU(1r1);::: QU(rr2). 
By B4, for each x; E X we have x; '"" a; for some stan­
dard lottery a; = (>.;jx, f.L;/.a;.) . Let us select a function 
u as follows u(x) =<1, 0>, u(.a;.) =<0, 1> and 
u(x;) =<A;,f.L;> for 1::; i::; n. (14) 
By B3, 7!"; (rri1/x1, 1r;2/x2, . .. 7r;n/Xn) 
(1r;da1, 1f;2/a2, . . . 1r;nfa.,,) fori = 1, 2. Let us give a 
name Pi to the right hand sides (i = 1, 2). We will show 
that Pi, which is a possibilistic mixture, is reduced to 
a standard lottery. By definition of mixture, 
(15) 
(16 ) 
and for all other x E X 
By B1, from n1 � 1r2 we have p1 � P2· By B2, since 
Pi are standard lotteries, Pl � P2 means either 
(PI (x) ;::: P2(x) and P1 (�) = P2(�) = 1) or 
(p1(x) = 1 and P2(x)::; 1) or (18) 
(PI (x) = p2(x) = 1 and Pl (.a;.) � P2 (.a;.)). 
Now, let us consider the pair < Pi (x), Pi (.a;.) > . By 
equations (15, 16) and definitions (11, 12), we have 
(19) 
Taking into account equations (19, 14, 13), we have 
QU(rri) =<pi(x), Pi(.a;.)> . And each of conditions (18) 
implies QU(rrl);::: QU(n2). 
(-<=)For a given u: X----> Uv such that u(x) =<1,0> 
and u(.a;.) =< 0, 1 > ,  a function QU : Ilx --+ Uv is 
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defined as in (13). We have to show that order t 
on IIx induced by QU (1r t 1r1 iff QU(1r) � QU(1r')) 
satisfies axioms Bl through B4. 
Bl is satisfied because the order on Uv is transitive 
and complete. 
Suppose a t a' where a = (>..jx, J.t/l;.), a' = 
(>..' jx, J-L1 j !f.) arc two standard lotteries. Because t is 
induced from QU, we have QU(a) � QU(a'). By lemma 
2 we have <).,, J-L> � <A', M'>. By definitions (10) and 
(8) we infer that t satisfies B2. 
Suppose 71'1 ""' 71'2. Because t is induced from QU, we 
have QU(7rt) = QU(7r2). By definition (13), we will 
have 
QU((>../1r1,11)7r)) = 
max(min(>.., QU(7r1)), min(J-L, QU(1r))) 
max( min(>.., QU(7r2)), min(J.t, QU(7r))) 
= QU((>.j1rz, J-L/'rr)) 
This means t induced by QU satisfies B3. 
Finally, the existence of basic utility assessment u to­
gether with lemma 2 guarantee satisfaction of B4. • 
4 Pessimistic, Optimistic or Unified 
Utilities 
In this section, we will do a comparison of three 
systems of qualitative utilities presented in previous 
sections. Since we have a representation theorem 
for each of them, we can discuss the systems either 
in terms of axioms or in terms of utility functions 
Qu- , QU+, and QU. 
First of all, note that the adjectives "pessimistic" 
and "optimistic" used for axiom systems S p, So, per­
haps, implicitly refer to the opposite direction of ax­
iom A2- and A2+. If n1 � 1r2 in numerical sense i.e .  
1r1 (x; ) � 1r2 (x;) 'ifi, then A2- requires 11'2 t 1T 1  while 
A2+ requires 71'1 t 1r2. A2- and A2+ are called un­
certainty attitude axioms. The former is "uncertainty 
aversion" and the latter is "uncertainty attraction" . 
But perhaps these names are a source of confusion. 
First, since axiom systems Sp, So are presented in 
style of von Neumann and Morgenstern [19] , it is ap­
propriate to recall similar terms "risk aversion" and 
"risk attraction. " In the linear utility theory, risk aver­
sion (attraction) refers to the concavity (convexity) of 
utility function. In other words, risk aversion and risk 
attraction are properties ascribed to individual util­
ity functions. They are not a property of the utility 
theory. Different psychological states may result in dif­
ferent utility assignment to the same outcome or a dif­
ferent assessment of uncertainty related to outcomes, 
but it is hard to conceive that they require different 
theories as implied by Sp and So. Operationally, the 
dichotomy of pessimistic and optimistic systems might 
also lead to difficulty in application. For example, how 
would a decision maker classify herself as either "opti­
mistic" or "pessimistic" or what would happen if she 
was unsure about either options. Moreover, in the 
writing of the authors for example [8, 6], it is clear that 
inequality of the form 1r1 � 1r2 is an informational re­
lationship. It says that 1r2 is more specific than 1r1. In 
other words, it says that 7!'2 contains more information 
than 7!'1 does. So it seems to us, the equation of infor­
mational relationship with preferential relationship t 
is not a very sensible idea. Although information has 
its own value, informational value per se rarely serves 
as a decision criterion. For example, decision making 
under uncertainty is mostly guided by von Neumann 
and Morgenstern's linear utility theory rather than by 
Shannon's information theory. 
Let us consider the following example. We face a 
choice between two lotteries 11'1 = (1/x, 1/!f..) and 
1r2 = !f.· In other words, 1r1 is a possibilistic distri­
bution on X such that 111 (x) = 7rr (lJ = 1, 7rr ( x) = 0 
for all other x and 1r2(J;,) = 1, 7r2(x) = 0 for all other 
x. According to possibility theory [8, 6], 1r1 describes 
a situation where we have knowledge to exclude all 
prizes except x and !f.· Moreover, we are equally sure 
about occurence of either of the prizes. 7rz describes a 
complete knowledge situation where all but ;£ are ex­
cluded. Because something is going to happen, 7rz is 
equivalent to saying that !f. is the certain prize. Ax­
iom A2- will force us to consider4 1f2 is at least as 
good as 71'1. In other words, if we were adopting S p 
we would have been indifferent between a surely worst 
prize and an uncertain outcome in which there is a 
hope to get the best prize. We believe such a choice 
is unreasonable. To see when axiom A2+ recommends 
a bad action, we could consider a choice between a 
surely best prize and uncertain outcome where there 
is a danger of getting the worst prize. A2+ will rec­
ommend the latter. Note that all these anomalies are 
corrected by axiom B2. 
Let us consider sets of standard lotteries B = 
{(..\jx, J.t/;£)1 ..\, J.t E V and max(>.., fj) = 1}, B- � 
{(1/'X,J-L/!f..)l J-i E V} and B+ �f {().jx, 1/!f..)\). E V}. 
We have B =B-UB+ and B- n B+ = (1/'X, 1/!f.). It 
is straightforward to verify the following lemma 
Lemma 3 Let t-, t+ and � denote respectively 
the order relations on B-, B+ and B imposed by 
A2-,A2+ andB2, t = �- u �+ u (B-x B+) 
4To be exact, a complete calculation would show that 
1r1 "' 1r2. But a lazy evaluation would suggest to choose 11'2 
over 1r1 without bothering further calculation. 
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The lemma implies that t-is the same as t restricted 
to B- and t_+ is the same as t_ restricted to B+. 
It is easy to check that Qu- ((>.jx, 1/:ld.)) = Qu- (�), 
QU+ ((1/x, 1-Lh)) = QU+ (x). In general Qu- and 
QU+ have the following property 
Qu- ((>./111, I/112)) 
Qu+ ((1/711, 11/112)) 
(20) 
(21) 
Proof: We will prove (20). The proof of (21) is just 
dually similar. Using equation (6), we have 
-cc 1 . {max(m(>.),Qu-(1r1))} QU >. 111, 1/tr2)) = mm max(nh(l), QU- (1r2)) 
(22) 
By definition of function nh (eqs. 3,4), m(l) = 
0. So, max(nh(l), Qu- (tr2)) = Qu- (tr2). Be­
cause of lemma condition Qu- (tri) ;::: Qu- (1r2), 
max(nh(>.), QU- (111 ) )  ;::: QU- ('rr2). By equation (22), 
we have Qu- ((A/tri, l/1r2)) = QU- (1r2) . • 
Thus, if a decision maker is pessimistic, whenever she 
sees that the less desirable prize of a lottery is fully 
possible she will ignore all considerations about other 
prizes and uncertainty to conclude that the lottery is 
as good as the least desirable prize. For a optimistic 
decision maker, once she sees the more desirable prize 
of a lottery is fully possible she concludes that the 
lottery is worth the same as that best prize. Roughly 
speaking, Qu- ( QU+) lumps together a half of total 
number of lotteries. 
It has been noted that Qu- and QU+ are "comple­
mentary" in a sense that although optimistic QU+ 
is not able to distinguish two lotteries (1/x, fJ.I/�) 
and ( 1/x, 1-Ld :Jd.), pessimistic Qu- can discriminate 
between them by comparing values of f.Ll and !-L2. 
The situation is reversed for lotteries (>.1/x, 1h) and 
(>.2/"x, 1/:Jd.). Again, we note that QU agrees with QU­
in the former situation and with the QU+ in the latter 
situation. 
With notations B-and B+, axioms A4- and A4+ can 
be restated respectively as Vtr E llx, 3cr E B- 1r "' cr 
and Vtr E llx,3cr E B+ 1r"' cr. We'll show that these 
axioms can be weakened, without any effect to the 
results, by requiring instead Vx E X. i.e., 
(B4-) Vx E X, 3a E B- x,..., a. 
(B4+) Vx E X, 317 E B+ x,..., 17. 
As we argued previously, these axioms are coun­
terintuitive. A4- requires, for example, the worst 
prize :Jd. is equivalent to some lottery where the best 
prize x is fully possible. But the presense of A2-
(A2+) makes the stated form of A4- (A4+) neces­
sary. Had A4- been substituted by B4 Vx E X, 3a E 
B x rv a, we would still have :!d. ,..., (1/x, 1/:Jd.), be­
cause (1/x, 1/:ld.) was the mimimal element in B ac­
cording to A2-. Let assume for some x' >- :!d. (x' is 
strictly preferred to :!d.) x' ,..., (>.jx, 1/.a;.). Using def­
inition (5) and the facts that nh(1) = 0, u(x) = 
1 and u(:Jd.) = 0, we calculate Qu- ((>.jx, 1/J;..)) = 
min(max(nh(.\), u(x)), max(nh(l), u(�))) = 0. From 
that we infer Qu- (x' ) = 0 = QU- (:Jd.). This is in­
consistent with assumption x' >- :Jd.. 
We have the following theorem that states precisely 
the relationship between sy stems Sp, So and S. 
Theorem 3 
(i) Sp F= s 
(ii) So f= S 
(iii) s u B4- F Sp 
(iv) SUB4+ f=So 
Proof: We will prove (i) and (iii). The proof of (ii) 
and (iv) is dually similar. 
(i) Assume A1- through A4- are satisfied , since Bl 
is the same as A1- and B3 is the same as A3-, we are 
left to prove that B2 and B4 are also satisfied. From 
A4- for each 1r E IIx, 3a E B- 1r "' cr. Obviously, 
X � Ilx and B- � B, so B4 is also satisfied (note 
that symbol X is used for the set of prizes as well as 
the set of singleton possibility distributions on set of 
prizes). And finally, we will show 5 that Sp f= B2. 
Assume that t satisfies Sp. For two standard lotteries 
cr = (>.jx, 11/:ld.) and 171 = (>.' jx, 11' /:Jd.). We want to 
show 
{ 1 ;::: ).. 2 >.' & J.L = j.L1 = 1 (1) 
17 t_ a' iff >. = 1 & >.' < 1 (2) 
>, = >.' = 1 & J.L :5 1-L' (3) 
(23) 
(If) Observe that if 1-L = 1 (fl' = 1), by theorem 1 
and lemma 4, we have a ....., :!d."' (1/x, 1/:ld.) (a' ,..., .a;."' 
(1/x, 1/:;&.)). In case (1) when J.L = J.L1 = 1, we have cr"' 
.a;. "' cr'. Thus, cr t_ a'. In case ( 2), since max(>.', 1-L') = 1 
from >.' < 1 we have fJ-1 = 1. Therefore, cr' '"" � "' 
(1/x, 1/:;&.). By axiom A2- we have a t_ (1/x, 1/J;.). 
From transitivity, a t cr'. In case (3), since ).. = >.' = 1 
and 1-L :5 fJ-1, by A2- we have crt cr'. 
(Only If) Assume cr t a'. By A4- we can assume 
>. = >.' = 1. Furthermore, fl > 1-L' would violate A2-. 
We have 1-L :5 1-L'· Thus, the right hand side of (23) (a 
disjunction) is true. 
(iii) Note that since B4- I= B4, set of axioms SUB4-
is effectively one that is obtained by replacing B4 by 
5Note that A2- states only a sufficient condition for t 
while B2 states both necessary and sufficient conditions. 
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B4-. We have to show that if B1, B2, B3 and B4-
are satisfied so arc Al-, A2-, A3- and A4-. Again, 
we do not have to worry about A1- and A3- since 
they arc identical to B1 and B3. 
First, we will show the satisfaction of A4-. From 
B4-, we can assume X; "' a; for 1 :S i :S n where 
a; E B-. We will show that \hr E IIx, :Ja E B- 1r"" a. 
Suppose a; = (1/x, f.-LJ£) for 1 ::::; i :S n. By B3, 
1r "" (7r(xl)/CJt,7r(xz)/az ... 7r(xn)/crn)· Applying the 
definition of mixture (1) for the right hand side, say p, 
of the indifference, 
p(x) = max min(1r(x;), 1) (24) l:S:t:S:n 
P(L) = 
1$�n
min(7r(x;),f.-l;) (25) 
and for all other x E X 
p(x) = max min(1r(xi), 0) = 0 (26) t::;,::;n 
We have p(x) = 1 because max; (7r(x; ) )  = 1. Thus 
7r "' ( 1/x, P(L) /22). 
Now we turn to A2-. Suppose 1r1 2 7rz. We just show 
that 7rt "' (1/'X,pt(L)/22) and 7rz "" (1/x,pz(L)/22) 
where p;(L) i = 1,2 is calculated by equation (25). 
Since 1r1 2 1r2, we have p1 (L) 2 P2(;&.). By B2, we 
have (1/x, P2(L)/L) t (1/x, Pt(;&.)/L)- From this, by 
transitivity we have 1l'z t 1l't· • 
Corollary 1 System Sp (So) is a special case of S 
when each prize in X has an equivalent standard lot­
tery inn- (B+). 
Since Sp and So are special cases of S, a question that 
can be raised 6 is if a "combination" of those special 
cases has the same expressive power asS. Specifically, 
if one considers pairs of pessimistic and optimistic util­
ities of lotteries <QU- (1r), Qu+ ( 1r)> can one come to 
something similar to binary utility QU( 1r)? We suspect 
the answer is no.7 
Example: Let X =  {x1,x2,x3,x4}. x = Xt >- xz >­
X3 >- x4 = 22· V = {1,.7,.5,0} and U = {1,.5,.3,0}. 
Consider 1l'1,1l'z E IIx with Kt(xt) = .7, 1rt(xz) = 
1, 1r1(x3) = .5, 1r1(x4) = .5 and 1rz (xi ) = 1, 1r2(xz) = 
6It was raised by a referee. 
7Here are some reasons for that. First, although B4- f= 
B4 and B4+ f= B4 we have B4 f!= B4- V B4+. In other 
words, when a basic utility assignment equates elements in 
X to standard lotteries on both halves of Uv, it violates 
both A4- and A4+. In order that < QU- (1r), QU+ (1r) > 
makes sense, somehow at least one of them must hold. Sec­
ond, on one hand, the 5et of <QU- (n), QU+ (n)> is a true 
two-dimensional object i.e., there is no visible dependence 
between QU- (n) and Qu+ (1r). On the other hand, set Uv 
iti not because one of the two numerical values in a pair 
must be 1. 
.7, 1r2(x3) = 0, 1rz(x4) = 1. We will compare utility of 
1r1 and 1r2 using Qu- and QU. 
For definition of QU- , let us assume that function n 
is given by n(1) = 0, n(.5) = .3, n(.3) = .5, n(O) = 1. 
Function h is given by h(1) = 1, h(.7) = .5, h(.5) = 
.3, h(O) = 0. Their composition nh is given by 
nh(1) = 0, nh(.7) = .3, nh(.5) = .5, nh(O) = 1. 
A utility assignment u which is consistent with the 
preference order x1,x2,x3,x4 is given by u(xt) = 
1, u(x2) = .5, u(x3) = .3, u(x4) = 0. Note that 
this utility assignment also means x1 ""' (1/x1, Ojx4), 
x2 "' (1/xt, .5/x4), X3 "" (1/xt, .7 jx4) and X4 "' 
(1/xl, 1/x4). Using definition (5) we calculate utility 
for 1r1 
and 1r2 
max(nh(.7), 1) } 
max(nh(1), .5) 
max(nh(.5), .3) 
max(nh(.5), 0) 
{ max(.3, 1) } 
. max(O, .5) mm max(.5, .3) 
max(.5, 0) 
min{1, .5, .5, .5} = .5. 
max(nh(1), 1) } 
max(nh(.7), .5) 
max(nh(O), .3) 
max(nh(1), 0) 
. { ::�
�3.��) } 
mm max(1, .3) 
max(O, 0) 
= min{1, .5, 1, 0} = 0. 
Thus, according to QU- , 1r1 which is equivalent to x2, 
is strictly prefered to 1r2, which is equivalent to X4. 
To define QU, we have Uv = { <0, 1>, <.5, 1>, <.7, 1> 
, <1, 1>, <1, .7>, <1, .5>, <1, 0> }. Take the following 
consistent basic utility assessment u(x1) =< 1,0 >, 
u(x2) =<1,.5>, u(x3) =<1,.7> and u(x4) =<1, 1 > . 
Using definition (13) we calculate utility for ?r1 
<1, .5> 
min(.7, <1, 0>) } 
min(1, <1, .5>) 
min(.5, <1, .7>) 
min(.5, <1, 1>) 
<.7,0> } 
<1, .5> 
<.5,.5> 
<.5,.5> 
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and 1r2 
m� { 
min(1, <1, 0>) 
} 
QU(1r2) min(.7, <1, .5>) min(O, <1, .7>) 
min(1, <1, 1>) 
m� { 
<1,0> 
} 
<.7, .5> 
<0,0> 
<1, 1> 
<1, 1> 
So, according to QU, 1r1 which is equivalent to x2, is 
strictly prefered to 1r2, which is equivalent to x4. • 
Let us consider the forms of functions QU- , QU+ and 
QU given by equations (5), (7) and (13) respectively. 
First of all, it is easy to note that QU looks similar 
to "optimistic" QU+ which, in turn, is quite differ­
ent from "pessimistic" QU- . The form of QU+ and 
QU reminds us of the expected utility in probabilistic 
approach where the expected utility of a probabilis-
tic lottery pis defined as EIJ(p) �f I:xEX p(x).u(x). 
Operations max, min have, respectively, counterparts 
in addition ( +) and multiplication ( .) .  This similarity 
leads us to refer to QU also as expected qualitative util­
ity function. The difference between functions QU+ 
and QU is that latter makes no use of function h that 
maps uncertainty scale V onto utility scale U. In addi­
tion to h, definition of QU- requires an order reversing 
involution n on U. 
But the key distinction between QU on one hand and 
Qu- , QU+ on the other hand is that the utility scale 
used for QU is an ordered set Uv of pairs of numbers 
that are conveniently taken to be in the uncertainty 
scale V. The utility scale Uv is chosen so that there is 
a one to one correspondence between Uv and the set 
of standard lotteries B. 
It is well known that probability theory interprets 
negation operation in a strictly complementary sense 
i.e., p(A) = 1 - p( -.A). That fact makes it sufficient 
to represent the occurence likelihood (or belief in Sav­
age's personalistic view) of an event by one number ­
its probability. Unlike probability theory, possibility 
theory as well as most non-probabilistic uncertainty 
formalisms e.g., Demster-Shafer belief function theory 
[15, 16] or interval valued probabilty [13, 20] describe 
uncertainty of an event by two numbers. They are 
possibility and necessity degrees in possibility theory; 
plausibility and belief in DS theory; upper and lower 
probabilities in interval-valued probability theory. It is 
also well known that the heart of decision making un­
der uncertainty is trading-off between uncertainty and 
utility. In order to enable the trade-off, utility and 
uncertainty must be "comparable." Therefore, binary 
utility is, perhaps, the "right" answer to binary uncer­
tainty. 
Focusing on standard lotteries, we can give the order 
on binary utility the following intuition. Since stan­
dard lottery a E B is a possibility distribution on X 
such that a(x) = ,\, a(1<_) = f.!. and a(x) = 0 for all 
other x E X, the possibility degree and the necessity 
degree assigned by a to x are ,\ and 1 -f.!.· Because dif­
ferent standard lotteries have exactly the same prize, 
comparison of their utility boils down to comparing 
how sure the prize will be realized. The highest con­
fidence level is, of course, represented by necessity de­
gree 1 that corresponds to ,\ = 1 and f.l = 0. The 
confidence level is decreasing when necessity decreas­
ing to 0. That corresponds to f.!. increases to 1. Before 
necessity degree becomes 0, the possibility is always 1. 
Once necessity equals 0, the confidence level can drop 
further with the falling of possibility degree from 1 to 
0. The least confidence level is when the possibility 
degree is 0 i.e. ,\ = 0 and f.l = 1. 
5 Conclusion 
In this paper we have proposed a system of axioms 
for decision making with possibility theory. Our ax­
iomatic system {S) unifies the pessimistic and opti­
mistic systems of axioms ( S p, So) previously proposed 
by Dubois et al. The unification is made by ( i) replac­
ing two informational attitude axioms A2- and A2+ 
(uncertainty aversion and uncertainty attraction) by 
the monotonicity axiom B2; ( ii) generalization of con­
tinuity axioms A4- and A4+ to axiom B4. Our axiom 
system subsumes both pessimistic and optimistic sys­
tems in the sense that any conclusion drawn by either 
Sp or So can also be made by S. But the reverse is 
not true. Our system can sensibly handle situations 
where neither S p nor So could. An example is when 
prizes in X have equivalent standard lotteries in both 
halves a- and a+ of B. Beside the simplifying effect� 
we argue that our proposal also removes uncertainty 
attitude from an utility theory to where it belongs -
individual utility assessments. 
We also prove a representation theorem for the unified 
system of axioms. Our utility function maps possibilis­
tic lotteries into an ordered binary utility scale where 
each utility level is a pair of numbers. The utility 
function is a composition of max, min operations that 
have been generalized in a natural way to work with 
pairs. The composition is similar to the composition of 
the classic expected utility expression where in place 
of max is addition and in place of min is multiplica­
tion. We also provide intuitive argument for the use 
8 Among other things, QU does not need auxiliary func­
tions n and h required by Qu- and Qu+ . 
1 70 GIANG & SHENOY UAI 2001 
of binary utility. 
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